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DYFED-POWYS  
POLICE AND CRIME  
COMMISSIONER

**Police and Crime  
Commissioner for Dyfed-Powys**

**Deep Dive Scrutiny Review  
into**

**Victim Withdrawal**  
**within Dyfed-Powys Police**

**December 2019**

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## 1.0 Executive Summary

In light of the responsibility of the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) to act as the voice of victims and to scrutinise the effectiveness of Dyfed-Powys Police (the 'Force'), the apparent rise in utilisation of Outcome 14 and 16 for domestic and sexual crimes and individual cases highlighted to the PCC, the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC) undertook a deep dive scrutiny review into victim withdrawal and the utilisation of Outcomes 14 and 16 in particular within Dyfed-Powys Police. The review found that:

It is evident that victims are a priority for the Chief Constable and for Dyfed-Powys Police as a whole with some good examples, as highlighted by the Quality Assurance Panel, of officers giving significant time to investigating incidents and empathy being shown towards victims. However, the review recommends a number of areas where improvements could be made to ensure delivery of the best possible service to victims and to ensure that the Force are truly victim centred.

Issues regarding the clarity of Force policy and the consistency and accuracy of the application of Outcomes bring into question the reliability of the data provided. As this forms the basis of numerous tasking activities within the Force's governance structure, there is a real concern that recommendations and actions may be ill informed. This was also evident in the findings from the scrutiny exercise undertaken by the Quality Assurance Panel, which highlight some confusion by officers regarding the appropriate application of Outcomes.

The current arrangements whereby certain Outcomes are applied by officers on the Crime Management System are only in place due to a lack of resources and officers have received no training to undertake this role. The arrangement does not provide any quality assurance, with no resources available to undertake audit or scrutiny functions. This report recommends that the scope of the current demand work within the Force should include a review of the application of Outcomes, with consideration given to a centralised resource to apply and quality assure crime Outcomes. This would ensure that the Force is delivering consistent practice aligned to national policy, negate the need for officer training, provide documented clear rationale in every case and allow confidence in the subsequent data produced.

It is difficult to achieve clarity regarding the performance data surrounding victim withdrawal. Much of the data is contradictory in nature or relies on so many caveats that it proves unreliable. Reports provided over time do not aggregate or display the data in a consistent manner and therefore make comparisons over time challenging and somewhat meaningless. Consideration of crime figures alone

may distort our understanding of victim behaviour and the service with which they are provided. The Force may therefore wish to consider a truly victim centred approach by focussing on data that is victim based, rather than recorded crimes. The Force should provide clarity on the data produced and its effectiveness and should ensure that the reasons behind performance trends and potential variance from national averages are fully understood and documented.

There are further complexities regarding the data sharing arrangements that accompany this information, which makes scrutiny from the OPCC particularly challenging and does not allow for transparency in demonstrating Force performance. This needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency.

The Force has recognised the impact of lengthy investigations upon victim engagement and has made significant progress in reducing the number of open investigations in excess of 12 months. Further work is required to maintain investigation standards not just with regards to the length of time taken but also in ensuring all procedural best practice is followed and appropriate evidence secured.

Victims engage well with specialist support services. Where withdrawals happen, they are predominantly for very personal reasons rather than being linked to any activity or inactivity by the Force. This is supported by the victim satisfaction data, which shows that the type of Outcome does not influence the level of satisfaction a victim feels regarding their overall experience of the Force. In fact, victims who withdraw are equally, if not more, satisfied with their experience as those receiving other Outcomes. If victims are at the centre of service delivery and are telling us that they are happy with their experience then surely this serves as adequate justification for any variance from the national average regarding application of Outcomes.

The review highlights some interesting trends regarding which agency makes the offer of support, with victims of domestic abuse in particular demonstrating a much lower rate of take up from generic victim services compared to specialist support agencies. This data should be utilised by the Force to ensure that the best support pathway is in place for victims across their criminal justice journey.

Lack of awareness of the support services on offer was repeatedly identified during this review. Without this, we cannot be assured that officers are making accurate and informed offers of service to victims. One of the most significant gaps is in relation to mental health, which has been demonstrated to be a significant factor in almost all victims who withdraw from the investigation. There are numerous services that exist to support individuals in this arena; the Force needs to ensure that both officers and victim services are signposting victims to the appropriate

support to ensure that mental health issues do not impact negatively on the progress of their criminal justice journey.

Numerous reviews and events have already been undertaken within the Force in an attempt to understand the various issues underpinning victim withdrawal. These will have had significant resource implications, whether in terms of actual funding for independent studies or staff time to undertake internal reviews. There are some key trends that emerge over the chronology of the recommendations with multiple reviews identifying the same areas for improvement at various points in time. Appendix C contains a full list of the publications along with their identified issues and recommendations; these are extensive. Actions are allocated to a variety of groups including the Victims' Board or the Domestic Abuse Gold Group and appear in operational action plans. However, these do not translate into informed priorities across departmental work plans at a strategic level: there is no central governance, no system by which the various action owners are held to account and no strategic oversight to inform service improvement.

Issues emerging from continuous improvement events include lack of awareness of support services, duplication of contact with victims, confusion over roles and responsibilities and lack of central coordination for victim feedback. These accord with recommendations from various reviews, including the need for specialist intervention at the earliest possible opportunity, concerns regarding victim updates, lack of clarity within policy and guidance documents and lack of quality assurance or confidence in the application of Outcomes. In turn these issues lead to a disjointed system and a poor service provision to victims.

In order to place victims at the centre of service delivery, the Police and Crime Commissioner therefore recommends that the Force:

1. Consider a centralised resource to apply and quality assure crime Outcomes in order to deliver consistent practice aligned to national policy
2. Provide clarity regarding the data produced and how it can be utilised, in particular how it can be shared with the OPCC and wider audiences
3. Continue the work into reducing lengthy investigations which may impact upon victim engagement
4. Routinely audit the adherence to investigatory procedures likely to impact on victim engagement, including Video Recorded Interviews, Body Worn Video and Closed Circuit Television that the PCC has invested in throughout the Force area
5. Ensure that the support pathway for victims is clear, with consent gained at the first point of contact for all future referrals. To include within this:
  - a. Ensuring that a victims' directory is maintained, with up to date accurate information to signpost victims to agencies providing mental health support and advocacy within our communities

- b. Improved awareness for victims, offenders and officers of the support services available
- 6. Proactively seek feedback from those victims who have withdrawn from investigations in order to inform service delivery
- 7. Review all recommendations and actions arising from existing victim engagement work and provide updates accordingly
- 8. Ensure that Continuous Improvement within the Force is strategically driven to support the control strategy and the Police and Crime Plan. This should include a central repository of information to identify trends and inform service delivery, along with clear guidelines regarding responsibility and accountability for emerging recommendations
- 9. Ensure clear strategic oversight of victim engagement issues, driving forward the cross departmental work required to place victims at the centre of service delivery
- 10. Provide consistent senior representation at local level on Domestic Homicide Review panels and ensure resulting actions are embedded into the appropriate governance and scrutiny structure.

## 2.0 Outcome

This review contributes to the Police and Crime Plan<sup>1</sup> by supporting the following priorities:

- Improve public confidence in Dyfed-Powys Police (Priority 1 – Keeping our communities safe)
- Identify those who are at risk of victimisation or repeat victimisation... through better information sharing between agencies (Priority 2 – Safeguarding the Vulnerable)
- Commission victim support services that offer emotional and practical help to victims of domestic and sexual abuse to help them cope and recover from their experience and to support them to achieve the best possible outcome through the criminal justice system (Priority 2 – Safeguarding the Vulnerable)
- Support victims of the most serious crimes to cope with and recover from their experience (Priority 3 – Protecting our communities from serious threats)
- Ensure that the public receive an accessible and responsive service (Priority 4 – Connecting with communities)

The review aimed to identify:

1. Whether the Force's utilisation of Outcomes 14 and 16 for domestic and sexual crimes is in line with national trends and whether the rationale for any performance deviations is understood and accepted
2. Whether the application of the above Outcomes identifies any issues with Force practice or the wider criminal justice journey
3. Whether the Force are utilising all opportunities to ensure timely and effective prosecutions
4. The Force's effectiveness in retaining the engagement of victim support for investigations
5. The extent to which recommendations from reviews commissioned within Force are monitored and governed
6. The extent to which continuous improvement outcomes drive improvement in service delivery

Through:

1. Identifying the current Force policy for utilisation of Outcomes 14 and 16
2. Identifying the trends in performance regarding application of Outcomes, both local and national

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.dyfedpowys-pcc.org.uk/en/the-commissioner/the-police-and-crime-plan/>

3. Undertaking a literature review of existing reports and continuous improvement events and the extent to which recommendations have been actioned
4. Presenting the views of victims and the Force's effectiveness in addressing them
5. Highlighting areas of good practice and any areas where improvements could be made.

## 3.0 Situation

### 3.1 Background

There were a number of factors that prompted this review, namely:

- The PCC has a statutory duty to act as the voice of victims
- The PCC has recently held an audience with individual victims of domestic abuse, sexual violence and stalking where concerns have been raised with their experience of the criminal justice system
- The PCC commissions both universal and specialist support services to ensure victims are appropriately supported from the point of crime throughout their criminal justice journey
- The Chief Constable's priorities issued in early 2018 included "to improve victim satisfaction and confidence in Policing" and "to support and protect the most vulnerable in our communities"
- Dyfed-Powys Police identified in their Performance and Outcomes Board in July 2019 a concern regarding the high proportion of Outcome 14/16 applications in domestic and sexual crimes
- Dyfed-Powys Police have internally commissioned a number of reviews over recent years to understand the application of particular Outcomes but have yet to provide a definitive explanation
- Dyfed-Powys Police have invested in a domestic abuse review, resulting in a number of key developments within Force operational strategies aimed at providing a better service to victims of domestic and sexual abuse
- The introduction of the Violence Against Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (VAWDASV (Wales)) Act 2015 placed the areas of domestic and sexual abuse under increased scrutiny from government.



## 3.2 Context

### 3.2.1 National context

The National Crime Recording Standards (NCRS) were introduced in 2002, with the aim of ensuring consistency between Forces and a more victim oriented approach.

In 2014, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) published the report 'Crime-recording: Making the victim count'<sup>2</sup> which probed the question "To what extent can police-recorded crime information be trusted?" This followed on from an inspection commissioned by the Police and Crime Commissioner for Kent, which found that more needed to be done before the public could be confident that the crime figures published by the Force were as accurate as they should be. From this the HMICFRS Crime Data Integrity Inspections were initiated.

In October 2019<sup>3</sup>, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) updated Police and Crime Commissioners regarding the action being taken nationally to support victims of rape. This included work across government and external agencies to identify priority areas. The National Criminal Justice Board has prioritised effective engagement between the system and victims/witnesses as one of their preliminary areas of focus following a national increase in application of the 'evidential difficulties, suspect identified – victim does not support prosecution' Outcome. The MOJ are currently building an evidence plan for a potential deep dive project on victim and witness engagement to consider the over-arching question "How can we improve victims' and witnesses' experiences of the criminal justice system so that they feel more able to progress with their case?"

The PCC has provided initial feedback to the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) regarding the findings and recommendations of this Dyfed-Powys report and will keep a watching brief over the developments of the national work in order that any emerging best practice can be considered.

### 3.2.2 Dyfed-Powys context

Calls for service to Dyfed-Powys Police have remained relatively stable over recent years with very little fluctuation in annual volumes. However, various changes in administrative process and recording practices appear to have had notable

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<sup>2</sup> Crime-recording: making the victim count. The final report of an inspection of crime data integrity in police forces in England and Wales. November 2014 HMIC

<sup>3</sup> Letter to PCCs 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2019 from Victoria Atkins MP, Minister for Safeguarding and Vulnerability and Minister for Women and Wendy Morton MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice

impacts on the volume of crimes being recorded. Some of these are noted in Appendix A.

Prior to April 2013 official statistics regarding crimes focussed on detections. From April 2013, the Home Office introduced the new Outcomes framework and from April 2014, police forces have supplied data to the Home Office on a set of 21 Outcomes that can be applied to crimes following their investigation.

The HMICFRS inspection of Dyfed-Powys in 2014 included a focus on Outcomes applied to out of court disposals. Outcomes did not feature in the most recent round of Crime Data Integrity Inspections. However, it is likely that they will feature in the next round of inspections. It should be noted that the most recent HMICFRS inspection, which considered NCRS audit Outcomes, determined the Force as requiring improvement in terms of data integrity.

Historically, there has been insufficient capacity within the Crime Audit Team to undertake any audits on the application of Outcomes. As a temporary measure, Outcomes have been included in the monthly audits focussing on NCRS, rape and domestic crimes.

The Force recognise that there is some work to do in relation to the accuracy of the Outcomes applied. In other Welsh Forces, a centralised unit exists to quality assure crimes and apply Outcomes. A decision was taken in Dyfed-Powys that due to lack of resources, officers would apply their own Outcomes. Officers apply certain Outcomes, 14 and 16 being amongst these, via the Crime Management System but no training was delivered to officers to support this decision. The Force Crime Registrar has submitted a training prioritisation request to include Outcomes on the training programme. This has also featured as a recommendation following a number of reviews, as detailed in the remainder of this report.

### **3.3 Policy and guidance**

At the October 2019 meeting of the Strategic Crime Recording User Group, it was agreed that Outcome application is inconsistent within Dyfed-Powys. An action was noted for the Force Crime and Incident Registrar to re-circulate the Outcome policy to Sergeants across the Force.

Appendix B provides an extract from Dyfed-Powys *Crime Outcomes guidance document updated April 2019*, along with definitions from the Home Office Outcome framework, iQuanta and Qlkivew performance tools. The Force guidance is not only contradictory within itself but also when compared to the definitions utilised in other Home Office documentation.

Whilst subtle, these differences in definitions raise a question as to the reliability of the application of Outcomes within Dyfed-Powys. It is recommended that the internal Force guidance should be reviewed to ensure that it provides absolute clarity to officers regarding the utilisation of Outcomes and furthermore that it is in alignment with definitions used within both internal and national performance publications.

There are also examples where data taken from the Crime Management System does not support Policy, for example the findings from the scrutiny exercise undertaken by the Quality Assurance Panel (see section 3.4.3) highlight some confusion by officers regarding the appropriate application of Outcomes.

### **3.4 Dyfed-Powys data**

What has become clear through the research undertaken to compile this report is that it is very hard to find the single source of truth. Much of the data is contradictory in nature or relies on so many caveats that it is unreliable as a source on which to base actions and recommendations. Reports provided over time do not necessarily aggregate or display the data in a consistent manner and therefore make comparisons over time challenging and somewhat meaningless. There are further complexities regarding the data obtained by the Force from the iQuanta system and the data sharing arrangements that accompany this information.

In addition to this, there are a number of contextual issues that must be understood when considering the data. These include a significant increase in 3<sup>rd</sup> party reporting, which makes it difficult to engage a victim in the investigation from the outset. Therefore consideration of crime figures alone may distort our understanding of victim behaviour and the service with which they are provided. Current performance data focusses on the number of crimes recorded, which does not equate to the same number of victims. The Force may wish to consider a truly victim centred approach by focussing on data that is victim based.

The Force will need to give further consideration to this area in order to provide some clarity on the data produced and its effectiveness. The Force need to be assured that the reasons behind the variance from national averages and trends in performance are fully understood and documented. Furthermore, the issue regarding the sharing of data with the OPCC and wider audiences needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency, in order to allow transparency in the reporting and scrutiny of Force performance.

### 3.4.1 Proportion of crime with Outcome 14 or 16 applied

Data on proportion of crimes with varying Outcomes applied is presented within the Data Driven Insights reports provided by the Performance and Governance Team. However, as outlined above, there are some concerns regarding the data sourced from iQuanta and to what extent this can be more widely shared. Therefore, the data below is taken from the Police recorded crime and Outcome open data tables provided by the Home Office<sup>4</sup>.

The table contains figures showing the proportion of crimes with Outcomes 14 and 16 applied, for a number of crime types. These include total crime, Rape and Other sexual offences. The national data available does not include any breakdown of domestic related crimes and therefore the table below includes the violence with injury sub category of Violence Against the Person crimes by way of providing some form of proxy measure.

The data clearly demonstrates an increasing trend in the application of Outcome 14 and 16 across total crime within Dyfed-Powys. The proportion is also significantly higher than the national figure. This accords with the data provided within the Data Driven Insights reports, although the reports do not contain any narrative to explain this variance.

For sexual offences in particular Dyfed-Powys is, on the whole, higher than the national average. However, both Rape and Other sexual offences show a slight decrease over time in the proportion of Outcome 14 and 16 applied.

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<sup>4</sup> Police recorded crime and Outcomes open data tables. Published 25 April 2013. Last updated 17 October 2019. <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-recorded-crime-open-data-tables>

Area	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	Q1 19/20
Total crime recorded as Outcome 14 and 16				
Dyfed-Powys	22.34%	27.07%	30.69%	33.66%
National	17.6%	21.01%	23.35%	21.18%
Sexual offences: Other				
Dyfed-Powys	30.14%	34.51%	27.77%	27.73%
National	26.23%	28.84%	28.70%	21.98%
Sexual offences: Rape				
Dyfed-Powys	56.25%	44.38%	47.17%	38.28%
National	42.19%	45.94%	43.62%	29.01%
Violence Against the Person (violence with injury)				
Dyfed-Powys	39.26%	39.98%	41.09%	39.23%
National	34.33%	38.54%	40.24%	35.82%

Figure 1: Crimes with Outcome 14 and 16 applied. Taken from Police recorded crime and Outcome open data tables, last updated 17<sup>th</sup> October 2019

### 3.4.2 Quality Assurance Panel scrutiny exercise

The Commissioner's Quality Assurance Panel (made up of independent residents) review crimes and incidents on a regular basis. In October 2019, the Quality Assurance Panel looked at a selection of 14 domestic-related cases in order to review how victims had been supported and communicated with throughout their case. The main feedback is captured below.

Members considered there may be some confusion about the appropriate application of Outcomes which may require clarification internally. They did not however consider this to be detrimental to the delivery of support for victims. Once an Outcome was applied, the Panel considered that the Police's internal scrutiny of Outcome application via supervisors was very good within the 14 cases reviewed.

It was felt that in the main, victims were well supported and were offered support from both the Police and other external agencies. It was felt that officers were giving significant time to investigating the incidents and empathy was shown

towards the victims. It also appeared that there was a reliance on the police to prompt and encourage a response from other agencies to support victims.

The Panel noted that within the majority of cases actions and rationales were well documented and the reasons for victim withdrawal were captured where appropriate. However, this was only captured within the body of text on the crime management system and required detailed screening of each case. Members urged the need for evidence of rationale for decisions be thoroughly documented, for example capturing a victim's wish to withdraw support within their statement. They therefore proposed that a question to prompt officers to explain why a victim withdrew would ensure a detailed and clear rationale that is easily retrievable for data capture or analysis. This, combined with a structured method of capturing feedback from support services, could provide vital insights for the Force to understand if officers or other agencies could do more to secure victims' support throughout an investigation.

The Panel also wished to note that the victims' choice to withdraw their support for investigations was not necessarily a sign of police failure, as officers were unable to control the victims' decisions.

Support services had been offered to 10 out of the 14 victims. The Panel considered that every effort should be made to secure a contact agreement with the victim to agree how and when they wish to be updated on the progress of the case. This should be coupled with the offer of referral to relevant support services in every case.

One case positively documented that CCTV footage had been considered but was not available to support the investigation. The Panel identified no other cases where the information recorded could evidence that either Body Worn Video (BWV), CCTV or victim video interview recording had been used or considered. This may be an opportunity for further consideration in order to secure ongoing support from victims, or to be able to continue with pursuing prosecution without the victims' support.

### **3.5 Support Services**

The PCC commissions a number of victim support services to ensure that victims are offered timely and effective assistance to help them cope and recover from the effects of a crime. This includes

- Goleudy, the victim and witness service, who will make contact with all victims in the immediate aftermath of the crime being reported
- New Pathways who provide a specialist service to victims of sexual abuse. This includes crisis support for those undergoing forensic medical

examinations as a result of the crime and ongoing Independent Sexual Violence Advocacy to help victims through the criminal justice process

- An Independent Domestic Violence Advocacy (IDVA) service jointly commissioned with the 4 local authorities across the Force area. This provides specialist support to domestic abuse victims assessed as high risk.

A dip sample of data from New Pathways for the period 1<sup>st</sup> April 2018 to 31<sup>st</sup> March 2019 showed the below:

- Carmarthen Sexual Abuse Referral Centre (SARC) received a total of 216 referrals. 95% of these accepted support.
- Newtown SARC received a total of 99 referrals, of which 99% took up support.
- Bow Street, Aberystwyth SARC received a total of 45 referrals, of which 96% took up support.

This shows that when offered specialist support, victims predominantly engage with the support service. During the period 1<sup>st</sup> September 2018 to 31<sup>st</sup> August 2019, from an active caseload of 622 clients there were a total of 43 (6.9%) withdrawals from the New Pathways service. The reasons for withdrawal provided by the victim are listed below:

Reason	Number of cases
Police took too long	1
Didn't think the case would go anywhere/ felt there was no evidence	3
Consented to sex – story changed	2
Client does not wish to pursue complaint	4
Can't cope with investigation	4
Life is too busy / too much going on	3
Unknown	5
Anxiety	1
Wished to remain friends/partners with suspect	2
Didn't want to put family through it	1
Only wanted suspect warned	2
Reason not provided by victim	15

Figure 2: Reasons for victim withdrawal from New Pathways service

Of those who withdrew, there were equal numbers of acute and non-acute presentations. The majority of offences (70%) were rape, with the remainder sexual assault. The cases were predominantly referred via Police (88%) so had reported the crime. 95% were female and 84% were aged 18 and over.

Detailed data is not yet available from the IDVA service, but approximately 30% of referrals fail to engage at first point of contact, with reasons including:

- The victim has other existing support mechanisms
- The victim doesn't feel support is necessary or relevant
- The victim is uncontactable, not responding to phone calls or letters

A further 10% (approximately) of clients disengage later in the support journey and this is usually because they feel that they have achieved what they wanted from the service (e.g. support to attend court) and don't feel they need the support any longer. This may be slightly prior to the point at which the IDVA would have naturally exited them from the service.

Domestic abuse victims assessed as standard or medium risk who provide feedback as part of Dyfed-Powys' victim satisfaction surveys are asked whether they were offered support by Goleudy and whether or not they accepted. Recent data over a 3 month period reveals the following:

- 54 victims should have been referred to Goleudy following standard or medium risk domestic abuse incidents.
- 27 (50%) reported that they weren't told about Goleudy.
- Of the 24<sup>5</sup> (44%) who were offered a referral, only 4 took up support (17%). This included general advice, emotional support and crime prevention equipment. However, the victim accepting crime prevention equipment was left feeling dissatisfied as they felt they needed a follow up call after the equipment was installed.
- Those who didn't take up the offer of support either stated that they felt they didn't need help at all or that the service wasn't what they needed. However, no further information was provided regarding what they felt would have assisted them.

This shows that half of the victims surveyed weren't appropriately informed or offered support by the officer at the time of the incident, with only 17% of victims referred to Goleudy choosing to take up the support.

During the year 1<sup>st</sup> April 2018 to 31<sup>st</sup> March 2019, the Goleudy victim and witness service received a total of 26,656 referrals for victims of all crimes. Of those, 15% refused the service on offer. Reasons for this are outlined below:

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<sup>5</sup> 3 did not answer that particular question



Reason	Number	Percentage of total refused
Not affected by the crime	1902	46.9%
Having support from family/agency	874	21.6%
Reason not given	733	18.1%
Refused other	456	11.2%
Don't feel like a victim	78	1.9%
Not supporting prosecution	11	0.3%
Cultural Difference	1	0.02%
Total	4055	100%

Figure 3: Reasons for victim non-engagement with Goleudy service

The above demonstrates a take up rate of 85% for victims of all crime for Goleudy's service. However, only 17% of domestic abuse victims offered the same service accepted the offer. Take up rates for offer of service from New Pathways are 97% and approximately 70% for the IDVA service. This suggests that whilst domestic and sexual abuse victims are engaging with support at specialist stage, they do not feel they require the generic interventions offered at first point of contact.

### 3.6 Victim feedback

The Force survey domestic abuse victims and victims of general crime but don't currently survey victims of sexual assault. The dip sampling does not exclude by Outcome, so a cross section of Outcome types are included within the sample set. The graph below<sup>6</sup> demonstrates the high satisfaction levels reported by victims who have withdrawn support for surveys conducted in the period to January 2019 (based on a sample of 125 victims).

What is important to note from this is that for Outcomes 14 and 16, a high proportion of victims reported being satisfied with their whole experience. In fact, victims who withdraw appear to be as satisfied with their experience as those receiving other Outcomes.

The graph below shows that 80% of victims with an Outcome 14 reported being satisfied, with 85% of victims with an Outcome 16 being satisfied.

<sup>6</sup> Note the below graphs are taking from data on the Force's Qlikview system hence the reference to declined and withdrawn support for Outcome definitions.





Figure 4: User satisfaction for surveys of victims of violence against the person conducted up until January 2019 (for crimes reported in October 2018) Outcomes 14 and 16 only

The graph below shows the number of respondents satisfied for other Outcome categories; overall 75% of these victims are satisfied with their entire experience.



Figures 5: User satisfaction for surveys of victims of violence against the person conducted up until January 2019 (for crimes reported in October 2018) All Outcomes

Victim surveying of domestic abuse cases (where the victim has stayed in contact) reveals the following feedback/recommendations received from victims:

- More assistance for the victim in collecting evidence
- Sending officers jointly with a mental health advisor
- Officers should be more aware of what services they can offer to the victim

- Incidents should be dealt with fully in the first instance. If they are not, this causes failure demand and a heightened risk to the victim when they have to report another incident "police didn't do anything originally and it then got worse".
- One particular feedback which resonates anecdotally with feedback from service providers is "I phoned them to remove my partner from the premises but instead they charged him and took him away, I didn't want that".

### 3.7 Continuous Improvement events

A number of victim based continuous improvement events have been held over recent years, outlined below:

- Victims' journey 2 events plus a specific domestic abuse victims' journey
- Domestic Abuse x 2
- Victim Satisfaction
- Sexual Offences (children)
- Sexual offences victim pathway workshop (adults)

A continuous improvement event held in September 2017 focussing on Victim Satisfaction highlighted an issue regarding there being no central repository for information. It listed numerous places where victim feedback currently sits including:

- DIS-SAT system used to record instances of customer dissatisfaction / complaints
- Victim Satisfaction Surveys
- Professional Standards Department
- Public Service Bureau
- Force Control Centre
- Frontline officers
- Victims Right to Review
- We Care feedback
- Customer complaints direct to departments
- Goleudy (both victim and witness care)
- Social media
- Police and Crime Commissioner's Office
- Out of Court Disposal Scrutiny Panel

A potential solution of a central repository was proposed to collate all feedback. This action plan was owned by the Superintendent holding the portfolio at the time but this particular action has never been resolved.

Issues raised at the sexual offences event for children held in November 2017 included that support pathways were not clear, for example officers were not

aware of what support is available for victims and Goleudy were not aware of who else is supporting the child whilst they are supporting the parents. This action plan was reported to the Victims' Board to consider solutions.

Some identified issues and resulting actions from the domestic abuse mapping event held in January 2019 include:

- Duplication between Goleudy, Criminal Investigation Department, Domestic Abuse Officers etc. regarding referrals to other departments. At a meeting in mid-October to discuss support provided to victims of domestic abuse this was identified as still being an issue.
- Not all safe numbers for victims were being pulled through from mobile data terminals into the Crime Management System. Whilst this is now much improved, it still remains an issue with data for the August 2019 domestic abuse victim satisfaction surveys reporting 24% (185) of records with no safe telephone number.
- Confusion over whose responsibility it is to update the victim, resulting in numerous agencies contacting victims. This action was allocated to the Victims' Champion in Force but remains an outstanding issue for resolution.

The above actions have been allocated to a variety of groups including the Victims' Board, the Domestic Abuse Gold Group and the Domestic Abuse Best Practice Framework for courts. However, there is no central location where the various action owners are held to account and no strategic oversight to inform service improvement.

Action plans from the above events are owned by the sponsor and it is for the sponsor to identify the appropriate forum for reports and updates. There is no central strategic direction driving the work of the Continuous Improvement team and resulting action plans are not reported via any central governance structure within the Force. This means that trends emerging across events both over time and across departments are not identified resulting in duplication of effort and failure to progress on key actions.

### **3.8 Previous reports and reviews within Dyfed-Powys**

The Force have commissioned a number of reviews both internally and externally regarding victim engagement. The below section explores the learning and recommendations emerging from these exercises.

#### **3.8.1 Insights from Victims<sup>7</sup>**

A research project was undertaken in 2016 by the University of South Wales to understand the underlying reasons for reporting or non-reporting of rape and

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<sup>7</sup> Historical reporting of sexual offences to Dyfed-Powys Police undertaken by Professor Colin Rogers, The International Centre for Policing and Scrutiny, University of South Wales 2016

sexual assaults. This research was endorsed by the PCC who provided £11,038 of funding to enable the research to be undertaken.

Initially, 30 victims agreed to take part but only 17 finally provided feedback. Therefore caution should be urged regarding the limited number of participants. Nonetheless, their feedback is important to assist with informing service improvements.

The main reason for individuals not reporting sexual offences at the time of their occurrence was that the victim thought that no-one would believe them. This was closely followed by the fact that they were too embarrassed to report the matter and that they were afraid of the perpetrator. The perception that a major reason for not reporting the incident in the first place may have been a lack of confidence in the police was not found to be major factor in the decision making of victims.

The main reasons for reporting the incidents at a later date were related to the support shown to victims by other people. This included family, friends and co-workers who encouraged and supported the victim. This accords with other findings where the victim seeks the support and comfort of close family immediately following such an incident, rather than contacting the police or other agencies to report.

Those individuals who stated they had been dealt with by Victim Support<sup>8</sup> seemed to suggest that they did not receive adequate support at the time of the event or in subsequent times. It was suggested that the advice and support offered was generic and not really helpful for the individual concerned. Feedback included:

- *"A more specific signposting to the right type of support is required. All I had was a Victim Support card and a phone number"*
- *"I chose not to phone the general number because I wanted a specific advisor"*
- *"Some initial advice helpful but not afterwards, no counselling offered until after the court case, as this was policy"*

New Pathways received mixed feedback within the report, ranging from *"Brilliant on the night and later counselling very helpful but only 16 months after the attack"* to *"Had to travel 2 hours each way to a building which was not wheelchair accessible. When New Pathways opened up their Newtown branch it was much, much better. Halved the travelling & the support given there was superb"*.

There were some very poor experiences of the New Pathways service; some of these relate to the availability of therapeutic counselling, *"Only started counselling 2 years after the incident"*, which is a recognised failing in the current system and

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<sup>8</sup> Victim Support historically provided the first point of contact victim service that is now undertaken by Goleudy

one which the Police and Crime Commissioner has raised regularly with partners and government officials.

Recommendations from the study included:

- Family and friends should be encouraged to ensure the victim reports the matter.
- Specialists should be utilised as soon as possible at the scene in order to reduce criticisms of first responders. This includes staff from New Pathways.
- The victim should be provided with information or briefed about the 'journey' that needs to be undertaken within the Criminal Justice System as soon as is reasonably practicable.

This review supports the theory posed earlier in the report that generic service support does not offer the service required by victims of sexual assault and that they require a specialist intervention at the earliest possible opportunity.

The recommendations were presented to the Crown Prosecution Service and internally within the Force to the Criminal Investigation Department. As a result some actions were incorporated into the tactical action plan for the rape and sexual offences portfolio. However, this plan sits at an operational level and currently has no direct reporting link to any strategic plan to provide oversight or linkages across to other departments.

### **3.8.2 Review of Outcome 16<sup>9</sup>**

In September 2017 the Collaboration and Efficiency team undertook a review of Outcome 16 usage and application for domestic abuse crimes. This piece of work originated after it was identified that Dyfed-Powys Police significantly increased their use of Outcome 16s on Domestic Crimes.

The review demonstrated that the Force were twice as likely to use Outcome 16 for a violent offence in September 2017 than they were in April 2014. Dyfed-Powys was also higher than its most similar group of Forces for application of Outcome 16 to all crimes and for cases of Violence Against the Person.

The review included county based audits of standard risk domestics in May and June 2017. The main areas for improvement highlighted by the audits are included below:

- Recording that the appropriate investigations have taken place, such as house to house enquiries and interviewing of witnesses
- Supervisors not challenging some of the investigative decisions by their

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<sup>9</sup> Outcome 16: Evidential difficulties: suspect identified; victim does not support further action. Collaboration and Efficiency. September 2017

staff; therefore victimless prosecutions not being identified where appropriate

- Some evidential opportunities being missed. For example, body worn video and / or 999 evidence was not being recovered on all occasions
- Officers not always recording a signed pocket note book entry or on the MG11 to support that the victim no longer wishes to pursue a complaint
- When a victim stated they no longer wished to support the investigation, no further work has taken place
- Lack of signposting to support agencies
- The rationale for recording the Outcome 16 wasn't always fully recorded on the crime log
- Time lags in the investigation: however, investigation work regarding 6 months and 12 months plus is now underway and successfully reducing timescales

The review highlighted some key investigative concerns but also reinforced the issues raised in the continuous improvement events regarding lack of signposting to support agencies and concerns regarding victim updates. The recommendations from the review were reported to the senior management team within the Criminal Investigation Department but it is unclear what action has been taken to address the recommendations. It is understood that some actions were incorporated into the tactical action plans; however as outlined above there is no central strategic oversight of this plan or the ability for it to inform cross-departmental work.

### **3.8.3 Outcome 16 Review**<sup>10</sup>

In September 2018, a review of Outcome 16 by the Performance and Governance Team analysed data in the period April 2014 to August 2018. The report notes as one of its more significant findings that the Force applies the largest rate of Outcome 16<sup>11</sup> for total crimes when compared to both its most similar group of Forces and the national average across total crime figures. It is the third highest across the Forces in England and Wales.

Nationally, Dyfed-Powys is the seventh highest Force with regards to the rate of applied Outcome 16 for violence against the person crimes, standing above the national average and the Most Similar Group of Forces. These findings mirror those demonstrated in the review undertaken by the Collaboration and Efficiency team a year prior.

While the data is unclear as to why rates of applied Outcome 16 have been increasing over time, or whether it will continue to increase, the potential inverse

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<sup>10</sup> Outcome 16 Review September 2018 Performance and Governance Team

<sup>11</sup> It should be noted that this review utilised the description of Outcome 16 that is provided within Force guidance, i.e. evidential difficulties: suspect identified; victim does not support further action

correlative relationship between Outcome 18 and Outcome 16 is an association that requires exploration (the Force's application of Outcome 18: *No Suspect Identified* is the lowest amongst 39 Forces who provided data). The review recommended further investigation into the use and suitability of Outcome 16 by means of crime audit examination in order to fully understand its frequent application. As identified at the outset of this report, the lack of clarity around definitions used within the Force for Outcome 14 and 16 in particular may be contributing to this.

#### **3.8.4 Rape and Serious Sexual Offences Review<sup>12</sup>**

Also in September 2018, the Performance and Governance Team undertook a review to highlight areas of delay in order to improve the victim journey in rape and serious sexual offences and provide a better service to victims. The review focussed on cases that had been open for 12 months or more.

The average time it took for a victim interview after the offence was reported was 6 days; the main delays noted were due to mental health and a lack of co-operation with the police. Once a victim interview had taken place on average it took 39 days to arrest or interview a suspect; historic cases saw the biggest delays as suspects had moved out of the Force area and took longer to locate.

The most notable findings from the review pertained to length of time taken for submission and analysis processes within the Digital Communications and Cybercrime Unit (DCCU) and delays within the file submission process; for example the average time taken to submit a case for pre-charge advice was 46 weeks and to submit to Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) was 46 weeks. The turnaround time from the CPS on a first time submission was 10 weeks, with case files being returned from the CPS for further work an average of two times per file.

The PCC's recent investment in new equipment and technology to enhance the Force's cyber-crime capacity will help to address some of these issues. The funding has helped to increase the specialist capacity for examining digital devices and introduce triaging methods to prioritise devices where there is the best chance of recovering evidence. This is essential in cases of domestic and sexual abuse where victims are at increased risk of disengaging during lengthy investigations.

#### **3.8.5 Outcome 16 Review<sup>13</sup>**

In November 2018, a more detailed review of Outcome 16 was undertaken by Inspector Diane Davies with the aim of reviewing the accuracy of Outcome 16

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<sup>12</sup> Rape and Serious Sexual Offences Review September 2018 Performance and Governance Team

<sup>13</sup> Outcome 16 Review November 2018. Author: Diane Davies



finalisations. The report stated that Dyfed-Powys police stands above the national average for Outcome 16 finalisation and is the highest within its Most Similar Group, again mirroring the position stated in numerous previous reports.

The review found substantial evidence of named suspects not being spoken with by police, in the majority of cases no rationale was applied to the decision not to engage with the suspect. Evidence is available within the sample set where the named suspect has gone on to commit further alleged offences including domestic related offences against the same victim. The reports states that failure to engage the suspect is a failed intervention opportunity and highlights lack of consistent consideration for victimless prosecution.

A further finding related to the inaccurate recording of Outcome 16 finalisations. Based on a sample set of 60 cases finalised as Outcome 16, 21 (35%) were assessed to be inaccurately finalised.

Compliance with the Victim Code of Practice (VCOP) was tested within the review. Over 50% of the data set (34 cases) were assessed to be non-compliant; this was noted in the review as particularly frustrating given that it is an area that has been reported on previously with limited improvement.

Some of the key recommendations emerging from the work are included below:

- Force Crime and Incident Registrar (FCIR) to update policy on requirements for Outcome 16 finalisation. Force policy currently requires written confirmation from the victim not supporting a prosecution. This policy is not routinely adhered to and is in conflict with accepted working practices.
- VCOP lead to develop an action plan for improved performance.
- FCIR to develop a single page crib sheet for staff summarising each available Outcome.
- FCIR to provide bespoke training and awareness on Outcomes to Crime Data Integrity (CDI) Champions.
- THRIVES to be prioritised on the force Training Needs Analysis
- Performance manager to consider whether Force Control Centre (FCC) staff should develop questioning skills using more open style questions.

A number of the recommendations mirror those provided within the report from the Collaboration and Efficiency team a year prior. These include full exploration of the potential for victimless prosecutions, ensuring victims provide a signature as evidence of their withdrawal of support, rationale for application of Outcome 16 not always being present/accurate and time lags in investigations. The review also provides earlier evidence of the findings outlined at the outset of this report regarding lack of clarity within guidance documents and policy not being adhered to.

Whilst some of the recommendations have been addressed via the work to reduce the length of investigations and the introduction of the vulnerability desk, there are many issues outlined in the report which resonate with recommendations from other reviews and reports and remain unresolved.

### 3.8.6 Sexual Offences Review<sup>14</sup>

In January 2019, a review of sexual offences was undertaken by the Performance and Governance Team. The review included analysis of 1649 sexual offences recorded and finalised between January 2014 and November 2018.

The review looked at the top 3 reasons identified for cases closed with Outcomes 14, 16 or 18. Victim did not want police contact and mental health featured within the top 3 reasons in nearly all age categories. The tables below show the reasons provided for the application of Outcomes.

Reasons for Outcome 14 finalisations	Percentage
1- <b>Did not want police contact</b> (Has either refused to give a statement, video interview or does not want to go to court/support prosecution )	44%
2- <b>Mental Health</b> (Victim does not want investigation to start/ go any further as it is impacting their mental health )	28%
3- <b>Did not perceive themselves to be a victim of crime</b> (Only wants the crime reporting/ wants words of advice given)	14%
4- <b>No victim disclosures, reported by a 3rd party</b> (Reported by school, health professional or family member )	9%
5- <b>Want the school or support services to deal</b> (Most common in child on child cases parents of both parties want the school to deal with the incident)	5%

Figure 6: Reasons for finalisation with Outcome 14

Reasons for Outcome 16 finalisations	Percentage
1- <b>Did not want police contact</b> (Has either refused to give a statement, video interview or does not want to go to court/support prosecution )	53%
2- <b>Mental Health</b> (Victim does not want investigation to start/ go any further as it is impacting their mental health )	22%
3- <b>Did not perceive themselves to be a victim of crime</b> (Only wants the crime reporting/ wants words of advice given)	15%
4- <b>Want the school or support services to deal</b> (Most common in child on child cases parents of both parties want the school to deal with the incident)	6%

<sup>14</sup> Sexual Offences Review January 2019 Performance and Governance Team

5- <b>No victim disclosures, reported by a 3rd party</b> (Reported by school, health professional or family member )	4%
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Figure 7: Reasons for finalisation with Outcome 16

Victims who stated their mental health as a reason for not continuing to support an investigation has become more prevalent in many recorded sexual offences especially in young people.

## 3.9 National reviews

### 3.9.1 The London Rape Review<sup>15</sup>

In July 2019, the Mayor of London Office for Policing and Crime published the London Review of Rape Cases, which studied 501 allegations of rape from April 2016. Within this review they considered factors affecting victim withdrawal. Some of the main findings are outlined below.

Of 501 cases studied, 58% of victims withdrew the allegation. The strongest predictors of withdrawal and police No Further Action decisions were procedural characteristics. Withdrawal was the most common form of attrition. Victims who withdrew did so soon after reporting and the majority within the police investigation stage.

Reasons for victim withdrawal were complex and often interrelated. There were typically multiple reasons given for withdrawal, the most common being:

- The stress and trauma caused or exacerbated by the investigation, particularly because of having to talk in detail about the incident
- A desire to move on from what had happened, often intensified by feeling surprised and overwhelmed by the process of official police investigation
- Concern for their own safety, or for the perpetrator's own situation, particularly in cases with a domestic abuse overlap where the victim's priority was often to put an end to the harmful behaviour, rather than a prosecution
- The act of reporting in and of itself being enough, with reasons for reporting focusing on wanting to get the incident off their chest or seeing reporting as their civic duty (in terms of providing relevant information and intelligence)
- Not having wished to report the rape in the first place, particularly in cases where the report was made within the context of the Domestic Abuse, Stalking and Harassment risk assessment

<sup>15</sup> The London Rape Review: A review of cases from 2016. Published July 2019 by the Major of London's Office for Policing and Crime

It was clear from the research that procedural characteristics, such as the administration of an Early Evidence Kit (EEK), which enables the officers to preserve forensic evidence from the victim, have an effect on victim withdrawal. Victims who were administered an EEK were 2 times less likely to withdraw.

It is also notable that if the victim participated in a Video Recorded Interview (VRI), withdrawal was six times less likely. However, it often took many attempts for the VRI to be completed and victims commonly withdrew before it took place. The report recommended routine reviews of whether VRIs were offered and whether victims are getting all the support they need to participate.

Having multiple officers in charge of the case predicted a higher likelihood (x8) of victim withdrawal. Victims typically liaised with the Sexual Offences Investigative Trained officer rather than the officer in charge throughout the investigation.

The only victim characteristic that predicted victim withdrawal was gender: male victims were three times less likely to withdraw compared to female victims. The presence of witnesses made victim withdrawal significantly less likely (x2), along with cases where the victim sustained an injury (x2). Victims who reported their rape in response to the DASH questions asked when police attended a domestic abuse call were three times more likely to withdraw than victims who reported by other means.

### **3.10 Domestic Homicide Reviews**

The responsibility for undertaking Domestic Homicide Reviews sits with Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs), with guidance provided by the Home Office. This is currently out of alignment with Safeguarding processes for conducting Serious Case Reviews and has raised some challenges at a Dyfed-Powys level regarding where accountability and oversight of the resulting action plans should sit. The PCC currently receives no formal communication from CSPs regarding either the review process or the action plans, which often contain recommendations for the Force.

Whilst CSPs are required to report action plans to the Home Office for approval, there is no central repository where plans are reviewed to identify trends in lessons learned or to provide wider recommendations at a national or strategic level. Progress against action plans should be reviewed regularly by CSPs, however there is no evidence of this happening routinely at local Partnership meetings.

The Mid and West Wales Regional VAWDASV Strategic Board have recently recommended that the learning from DHRs be included in the Regional VAWDASV Communications Strategy. It would be beneficial for the Force to provide consistent senior representation at local level on DHR panels and to ensure

resulting actions are embedded into the appropriate governance and scrutiny structure.

## 4.0 Consequences

### **Performance**

It is difficult to achieve clarity regarding the performance data surrounding victim withdrawal. Much of the data is contradictory in nature or relies on so many caveats that it is unreliable. Reports provided over time do not necessarily aggregate or display the data in a consistent manner and therefore make comparisons over time challenging and somewhat meaningless. Without confidence in the data, it cannot be used as a reliable source on which to base actions and recommendations. It also leads to wasted resources in attempting to provide an understanding and justification for apparent performance trends or variances from the national picture.

There are further complexities regarding the data sharing arrangements that accompany this information. At present it is unclear what data can be shared between the Force and the OPCC and what is available to be published. This makes scrutiny from the OPCC particularly challenging and does not allow for transparency in demonstrating Force performance.

### **Process, policy and guidance**

It is imperative that internal Force policy provides an accurate, consistent guide for officers in line with the guidance provided by the Home Office. If officers are unclear on definitions Outcomes will not be correctly or consistently applied. This not only creates an issue in terms of compliance but also raises significant questions regarding the integrity of the data on which operational decisions and recommendations are based.

There is a more fundamental consideration here regarding the Force's process for application of Outcomes. As highlighted in the report, other Welsh Forces utilise a centralised unit to quality assure crimes and apply Outcomes. This difference in approach could potentially explain the variance between Dyfed-Powys performance when compared against national and Most Similar Force figures.

### **Victim contact**

It is evident from the research undertaken for this report that there are concerning levels of duplication between departments and services with regards to who is supporting and updating victims. This leads to two equally unpalatable scenarios; either a victim who is left with no support and no information or a victim who is bombarded with confusing phone calls from a host of agencies or individuals with no clarity regarding roles and responsibilities. It is confusing enough for a victim

to navigate the criminal justice system without adding additional layers of unnecessary duplication.

### **Support services**

The Commissioner has a duty to provide services to ensure that victims are appropriately supported from point of report throughout their criminal justice journey. Victims are more likely to remain engaged with investigations if their needs are met in terms of assisting them to cope and recover from the impact of the crime. It is vital therefore that frontline officers are aware of all available services in order to ensure that the offer of service to victims is timely and accurate. Victims need to feel informed about the services on offer and be able to access them not just at point of report but also at any future time if they so wish. The Force also need to be clear on the support pathway being offered to victims at all stages of their criminal justice journey.

### **Mental Health**

Mental Health features within the top 2 reasons for all victim withdrawals. Whilst training for Sexual Offences Investigative Trained Officers includes an input on both mental health and the role of Independent Sexual Violence Advisors, there is a significant gap for victims with mental health issues that are undiagnosed and fall below any clinical thresholds regarding where they can be signposted for support. Goleudy staff have recently highlighted mental health training, in particular handling of victims with suicidal intent, as a key priority.

Despite investment by the Police and Crime Commissioner into the provision of a comprehensive victims' directory, this is no longer available on the Goleudy website. This has resulted in a significant gap for either victims or officers to locate appropriate support services that can offer mental health advocacy. There are many support services within our communities that are available to anyone requiring support. Following discussion with the Criminal Justice Department, a link to Dewis Cymru is now available which should go some way to addressing this gap. Provision of this support would not only help victims to better cope with the impact of a crime but would also increase the likelihood of them remaining engaged with the criminal justice system.

### **Informed and prioritised work plans**

It is evident that the Continuous Improvement function within the Force is not centrally driven in alignment with the Force priorities or Control Strategy. Outcomes do not appear to be governed and therefore there is no confidence that recommendations identified within these events are being used to drive service improvement. The team are a valued asset within the Force and the commitment from not just the team but all the attendees at each event is evident. However, there is a very real risk of resources being utilised inappropriately and duplication of time and effort.

Anecdotal feedback from attendees reveals a sense of frustration regarding the lack of transparency and accountability for actions identified within the events. A pertinent example is the fact that the deep dive undertaken by the PCC into tackling illegal drugs in April 2019 established the same recommendations regarding Testing On Arrest as had been identified in a continuous improvement event held two years prior. Had these recommendations been addressed, the deep dive would have revealed a very different picture.

One of the current areas for improvement within the HMICFRS action plan relates to compliance with the Victims' Code of Practice for fraud investigations. A victim satisfaction survey has been suggested to address this, with PCSOs reviewing a dip sample of vulnerable victims and relatives to obtain feedback on the service provided. This was proposed to commence in August 2019. The proposed action provides no clarity regarding how this process will align with existing functions to ensure consistency and avoid duplication, where these results will be fed back and how the Force will ensure that they are utilised alongside other information to inform service provision.

### **Strategic Oversight**

The report identifies a clear gap in strategic oversight of victims' experiences. Whilst many of the recommendations arising from previous reviews and events are fed into action plans at the tactical or operational level, this does not appear to translate easily into strategic planning. The Force operates a Vulnerability Action Plan which feeds into the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) national action plan. Earlier in 2019, a response to Dyfed-Powys following a national benchmarking exercise noted that there were numerous pockets of good work being undertaken but with a lack of strategic oversight. Whilst victim issues are discussed both at the Victims and Witness Board and the Strategic Vulnerability Board, these Boards are not structured in a way that enables them to inform the priorities of departments such as Corporate Communications, Learning and Development etc. which are vital to delivering what is required.

## **5.0 Actions**

Upon consideration of the information obtained as part of this review, the Police and Crime Commissioner requests that the Chief Constable considers the following recommendations:

1. Consider a centralised resource to apply and quality assure crime Outcomes in order to deliver consistent practice aligned to national policy
2. Provide clarity regarding the data produced and how it can be utilised, in particular how it can be shared with the OPCC and wider audiences



3. Continue the work into reducing lengthy investigations which may impact upon victim engagement
4. Routinely audit the adherence to investigatory procedures likely to impact on victim engagement, including Video Recorded Interviews, Body Worn Video and Closed Circuit Television that the PCC has invested in throughout the Force area
5. Ensure that the support pathway for victims is clear, with consent gained at the first point of contact for all future referrals. To include within this:
  - a. Ensuring that a victims' directory is maintained, with up to date accurate information to signpost victims to agencies providing mental health support and advocacy within our communities
  - b. Improved awareness for victims, offenders and officers of the support services available
6. Proactively seek feedback from those victims who have withdrawn from investigations in order to inform service delivery
7. Review all recommendations and actions arising from existing victim engagement work and provide updates accordingly
8. Ensure that Continuous Improvement within the Force is strategically driven to support the control strategy and the Police and Crime Plan. This should include a central repository of information to identify trends and inform service delivery, along with clear guidelines regarding responsibility and accountability for emerging recommendations
9. Ensure clear strategic oversight of victim engagement issues, driving forward the cross departmental work required to place victims at the centre of service delivery
10. Provide consistent senior representation at local level on Domestic Homicide Review panels and ensure resulting actions are embedded into the appropriate governance and scrutiny structure.

## 6.0 Review

### 6.1 Aims

This body of work sought to identify:

1. Whether the Force's utilisation of Outcomes 14 and 16 for domestic and sexual crimes is in line with national trends and whether the rationale for any performance deviations is understood and accepted
2. Whether the application of the above Outcomes identifies any issues with Force practice or the wider criminal justice journey
3. Whether the Force are utilising all opportunities to ensure timely and effective prosecutions
4. The Force's effectiveness in retaining the engagement of victim support for investigations



5. The extent to which recommendations from reviews commissioned within Force are monitored and governed
6. The extent to which continuous improvement Outcomes drive improvement in service delivery

Through:

1. Identifying the current Force policy for utilisation of Outcomes 14 and 16
2. Identifying the trends in performance regarding application of Outcomes, both local and national
3. Undertaking a literature review of existing reports and continuous improvement events and the extent to which recommendations have been actioned
4. Presenting the views of victims and the Force's effectiveness in addressing them
5. Highlighting areas of good practice and any areas where improvements could be made.

## 6.2 Conclusion

The review has served to highlight a number of key areas for improvement for the Force to ensure it is delivering the best possible service to keep victims engaged within the criminal justice process. It is clear that victims are a priority for the Chief Constable and for Dyfed-Powys Police as a whole. However, the report suggests that the Force are not truly victim centred.

Issues with the clarity of Force policy and the consistency and accuracy of the application of Outcomes bring into question the reliability of the data provided. This is compounded by the fact that there is currently no quality assurance or scrutiny of Outcome application. Much of the data is contradictory in nature or relies on so many caveats that it is unreliable.

Victims engage well with specialist support services, with reported withdrawals revealing personal reasons rather than being linked to any activity or inactivity by the Force. This is supported by the victim satisfaction data, which shows that victims who withdraw appear to be as satisfied with their experience as those receiving other Outcomes.

The review highlights some interesting trends regarding which agency offers the support, with victims of domestic abuse in particular demonstrating a much lower rate of take up from the Goleudy service (17%) when compared to victims of all crimes offered a service by Goleudy (85%). Take up rates for the offer of service from a specialist support agency such as New Pathways are 97%, with 70% engaging with IDVA services.

Lack of awareness of the support services on offer was also repeatedly identified during this review. This is despite numerous awareness raising activity undertaken by the OPCC with regard to commissioned services including press articles, tasking meetings, internal bulletins and production of aide memoires for officers. Clearly there remains a gap in the knowledge and awareness of officers. Without this, we cannot be assured that officers are making accurate and informed offers of service to victims in order to ensure maximum engagement.

An important gap with regards to support services on offer is in relation to mental health. This has been demonstrated to be a significant factor in almost all victims who withdraw from the investigation. However, victims report anxiety and similar challenges which are below any diagnosable threshold for access to mental health services. There are numerous services which exist to support individuals in this arena including those provided by Samaritans and Mind and the Force needs to ensure that both officers and victim services are signposting victims to the appropriate support agencies.

Numerous reviews and events have already been undertaken in the Force's attempt to understand the issue of victim withdrawal, with significant resource implications. There are some key trends that emerge over the chronology of the recommendations with multiple reviews identifying the same areas for improvement at various points in time. It appears that there is no central oversight of the recommendations to emerge from such reviews or events. Therefore, whilst actions are included in operational or tactical action plans they do not translate into informed priorities across departmental work plans at a strategic level in order to influence service delivery.

The Police and Crime Commissioner is committed to monitoring the Chief Constable's progress against the recommendations set out within this review through regular progress updates provided to Policing Board.

## **Appendix A – Additional context for increase in crime recording**

The below have collectively contributed to increases in volumes of crime recorded:

- In April 2014 the new Outcomes framework removed detection rates, in turn removing performance pressures resulting in more crimes being recorded.
- Following the Crime Data Integrity Inspection in 2014 there was a significant push on accurate crime recording and processes.
- In December 2015 a new offence of 'engaging in Controlling/Coercive behaviour in an intimate family relationship' contrary to the Serious Crime Act 2015 Sec 76 commenced and was recorded as 105A Assault without injury.
- The Incident Crime Allocation Team (ICAT) was introduced in April 2017, with responsibility for the investigation of certain crime categories in order to assist front line police officers. A change in crime recording process followed in May 2017.
- In April 2018 the Vulnerability Desk was introduced to review domestic related incidents to ensure accurate recording of crime and Domestic Abuse Stalking and Harassment (DASH) booklets.

## Appendix B – Crime Outcomes Policy

The below is taken from Dyfed-Powys *Crime Outcomes guidance document updated April 2019*, which is available via the Force Crime Registrar's page of the intranet.

This guidance is contradictory within itself but also when compared to the definitions utilised in other Home Office documentation. For example, Page 1 of the guidance states as below:

### Outcomes applied by Officers via CMS

*Outcome 14 – Evidential difficulties – Named suspect NOT identified - **victim does not support***

*Outcome 16 – Evidential difficulties – Named suspect – **victim does not support***

The above Outcomes are in line with the Outcomes bulletin released by the Home Office in July 2019<sup>16</sup>. However, further within the Force's guidance document it states:

*Outcome 14 Evidential Difficulties (Victim based) - Named Suspect NOT identified*

*The crime is confirmed but **victim either declines or is unable to support further police investigation** to identify the offender*

*If the victim tries to identify the suspect without success and the suspect cannot be identified by other means another Outcome type should be considered. This Outcome can also be used if the Suspect is known by a nickname only but their full identity cannot be established.*

*Where the victim declines to identify the suspect a signed PNB or statement should be obtained from the victim where possible.*

*If the victim declines to complete a statement or sign a PNB this should be included in the decision making rationale.*

- *Document the reasons why further action is prevented in the CMS Enquiries.*
- *Scan any supporting documentation that documents the victim's refusal or inability to support further investigation onto CMS.*

*Outcome 16 Evidential difficulties – Victim based*

<sup>16</sup> Crime Outcomes in England and Wales: year ending March 2019. Statistical Bulletin HOSB 12/19

***A Named Suspect has been identified but **the victim does not support (or has withdrawn support for) Police action.*****

*This Outcome would be used where CPS determine that despite there being a named suspect nevertheless there is insufficient evidential opportunity to secure a realistic prospect of a conviction. This includes crimes where the victim does not support Police action from first contact (but the suspect is named) and where support is initially given but later withdrawn.*

*In certain circumstances prosecution can still take place without the victim supporting the prosecution e.g. serious offences and domestic incidents. If this is the case then another Outcome type should be used as appropriate.*

*Where the victim declines to support Police action a signed PNB or statement should be obtained from the victim where possible.*

*If the victim declines to complete a statement or sign a PNB this should be included in the decision making rationale.*

- *Ensure an identified or named suspect record is attached to the crime record (contact CRB to update if necessary).*
- *Document the reasons why further action is prevented in the CMS Enquiries.*
- *Scan any supporting documentation that documents the victim's refusal or withdrawal of support further investigation onto CMS.*
- *If the victim declines to complete a statement or PNB this should be endorsed in the CMS.*

The descriptions contained in the boxes above align with the original guidance provided by the Home Office<sup>17</sup> when the Outcomes framework was established in 2014. These are also the definitions used within iQuanta.

On the Force's performance management tool Qlikview, the description of the Outcomes are as below:

- Outcome 14 victim declines/unable to support action
- Outcome 16 victim does not (or has withdrawn) support

<sup>17</sup> Crime Outcomes in England and Wales 2014/15 Statistical Bulletin 01/15

## Appendix C – Recommendations and issues emerging from existing reviews

Review	Author / Sponsor	Date	Recommendations / Issues identified	Update
Victims' journey 2 Continuous Improvement events plus a specific domestic abuse victims' journey	Detective Chief Superintendent for Criminal Investigation Department and Assistant Director of Criminal Justice	March 2016	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Dyfed Powys Police (DPP) to set up central mailbox for defence applications in order that all notices are received in one place. DPP to notify Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) of all applications. Her Majesty's Courts and Tribunal Service (HMCTS) to ensure proper compliance with Criminal Procedure Rules. Defence representatives on Local Criminal Justice Board (LCJB) and Summary Justice Performance Group to ensure all Defence Solicitors are made aware of the issue and proposed solution.</li> <li>2. Sexual offences to be automatically referred to New Pathways by police at point of report.</li> <li>3. Raise Officer awareness of importance of informing Independent Sexual Violence Advisors (ISVAs) of cases with No Further Action</li> <li>4. Insufficient info re the risk assessment undertaken for Restorative Justice – process to be reviewed</li> <li>5. Inform staff in Witness Care Unit that HMCTS are to be copied into emails. Amend letter introducing Citizens Advice Witness Service (CAWS) to make it clearer who to contact.</li> <li>6. Not enough pre-trial visits being arranged Potential to pay expenses for pre-trial visits</li> <li>7. Requirement for special needs to be considered to be included as part of training to be rolled out for all officers re: special measures and vulnerability.</li> </ol>	

			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8. CPS to look at potential of including charge information to CAWS</li> <li>9. Information provided to victim re: video link can cause confusion Training being rolled out to Officers. CPS offered assistance with this.</li> <li>10. Refer people to the Help Hub website which can be kept up to date.</li> <li>11. Consider possibility of personalised letters to increase Restorative Justice self-referrals</li> <li>12. Probation and Witness Care to agree best referral method for victims requiring victim liaison support.</li> <li>13. Late results for Remand Offenders (4.30pm Friday) – Probation to look at the number of occurrences.</li> <li>14. Mental Health Duty to Victims &amp; Partners (Victim Contact Scheme) - what is the number of cases that this affects within DPP</li> <li>15. CPS/HMCTS will look at why some restraining orders are not being forwarded on to witness care</li> <li>16. More conversations required with lawyers about releasing witnesses.</li> <li>17. Restorative Justice criteria – too rigid &amp; limiting the number of self-referrals? OPCC to look at potential for expanding the criteria.</li> <li>18. Reiterate to Officers to update the Crime System when victim has been updated. Is there an IT fix?</li> <li>19. Restraining Orders. Use the wording of the Restraining Order written by District Judge Richard Williams.</li> <li>20. Summons &amp; Conduct money for victims / witnesses to attend court. Look into reverting back to organising transport for the witness rather than issuing conduct. Conduct money is not currently provided by external forces.</li> <li>21. Responsibility for victim during the trial. Need a Protocol regarding differing responsibilities for various roles</li> </ol>	
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Insights from Victims	University of South Wales	2016	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The support provided by family and friends who were aware of the victims allegations should be acknowledged by the criminal justice system (CJS) agencies and family and friends should be encouraged to ensure the victim reports the matter.</li> <li>2. With regard to the police, officers should be reminded that previous complainants should be treated as if they were first time victims, thus obviating the criticisms regarding previous contact with the police shaping their perceptions of victims.</li> <li>3. The police should highlight the fact that victims stated that they (the police) would believe them in order to encourage others to do likewise.</li> <li>4. The support provided by family and friends who were aware of the victims allegations should be acknowledged by the CJS agencies and family and friends should be encouraged to ensure the victim reports the matter.</li> <li>5. An overreliance on the influence of the media to encourage such incidents to be reported through publication of high profile cases may be misplaced. It may be better to utilise media to encourage families to support reporting of such offences.</li> <li>6. At initial point of contact, the police should be aware of the sensitive nature of the incident and treat the victim with all due respect. Specialists should be utilised as soon as possible at the scene in order to reduce criticisms of first responders. This includes staff from New Pathways.</li> <li>7. Similarly, the victim should be provided with information or briefed about the 'journey' that needs to be undertaken within the Criminal Justice System as soon as is reasonably practicable. This will manage individual's perceptions and help avoid any future conflict.</li> <li>8. The role of the CPS and the courts should be clearly explained to victims who have difficulty in separating the functions of both agencies. Much criticism of the whole procedure was levelled at these two agencies.</li> </ol>	
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			<p>9. Policy should ensure a clear and consistent partnership procedure for dealing with victims of such offences, including an understanding of the role of different agencies, and where they should be introduced into the procedure for the benefit of the victim.</p>	
Review of Outcome 16	Collaboration and Efficiency Team	September 2017	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Officers were not always carrying out full enquiries to support the investigation, for example is Body Worn Video being utilised at all opportunities?</li> <li>2. Pocket Notebooks weren't always signed by the victim that they did not wish to support the investigation</li> <li>3. Supervisors not challenging some of the investigative decisions (or lack of) by their staff - are victimless prosecutions being identified where appropriate?</li> <li>4. Lack of signposting to support agencies</li> <li>5. Work not being reallocated when appropriate - victim becomes disillusioned</li> <li>6. Voluntary Interview as opposed to arrest - does this mean longer wait times for a suspect to be interviewed and therefore a prosecution being delayed</li> <li>7. Time lags in the Investigation</li> </ol>	
Victim Satisfaction Continuous Improvement Event	Superintendent holding the portfolio	September 2017	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Central repository required to collate all feedback information: feedback via different avenues</li> <li>1. Give Force Control Centre (FCC) access to Crime Management System (CMS) permission to update - only in certain circumstances</li> <li>2. Resources available need to be fully explained to FCC/officers e.g Track my Crime, more promotion needed</li> <li>3. Pressure on call handlers to answer as many calls quickly as possible, causing data integrity issues</li> <li>4. Victim consent questions on Mobile Data Terminals are confusing. Incomplete information going to Goleudy</li> <li>5. Lack of updates to victims, biggest cause of dissat. Ensuring victims are updated as and when agreed</li> </ol>	

			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6. We Care - are we continuing with this? Guidance is required around the We Care initiative: When should it be issued? What point of investigation? To whom?</li> <li>7. Too much info to be provided (leaflets) e.g victim of crime leaflet, We Care card</li> <li>8. Service recovery unclear - more clarity on who should deal with problem. Public Service Bureau work office hours - if complaint after 6pm where then?</li> <li>9. Victim updated via tasking not working, tasking for supervisors requires amending</li> <li>10. Free text responses not being analysed at present. Losing valuable information and context</li> </ol>	
Sexual Offences (children)	Superintendent holding the portfolio	November 2017	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. First Attendance policy to be developed to address lack of clarity re who incident is allocated to, creation of safeguarding referrals etc.</li> <li>2. Feedback to Regional Safeguarding Board re timeliness of information provided by some partners e.g. Education or Health</li> <li>3. Issues re provision of paediatric service for medical exams - Feed into Sexual Abuse Referral Centre (SARC) meeting and query risk register: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Child has to travel to Swansea /Cardiff to SARC.</li> <li>• Lack of funding for SARCs in rural areas.</li> <li>• Travelling time for Paediatrician or Forensic Medical Examiner (FME). They may be hours away and examination may be delayed until next day.</li> <li>• If both the suspect in custody and the victim need a medical examination, DPP don't have enough FMEs available to deal with both.</li> </ul> </li> <li>4. Criminal Investigations Department Training to attend Rape Steering Group. Other potential improvements include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Witness Impact Booklet training to new recruits</li> <li>• Training days for established officers, especially response.</li> <li>• Train the trainer days using a specialist trainer</li> </ul> </li> </ol>	

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Communication</li> </ul> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. Feedback joint working / training suggestions to Social Services. Other potential improvements include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Clarity or guidance on what support is there for the child.</li> <li>• Joint training for Joint Investigation Unit / Protecting Vulnerable People and social workers to help build rapport.</li> </ul> </li> <li>6. Policy re use of Intermediaries needs to be clarified.</li> <li>7. Feed into Rape Steering Group meetings and Video Interview Meetings with courts to look at best practice and what went wrong.</li> <li>8. Establish email groups of specialists to share best practice.</li> <li>9. Other potential improvements include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refresher training in planning for specialist interviewers.</li> <li>• Child supporters to be available for the video interview.</li> <li>• Planning and preparation training / refresher training</li> <li>• Planning for the interview - prepping room and deciding on the best way to proceed</li> <li>• Make better use of Interview Advisers for complicated cases. Publicise who they are.</li> <li>• Best practice training.</li> <li>• Monitors - training for all officers on equipment &amp; clearly defined guidance on role of monitors.</li> <li>• Equipment - earpieces for communication with monitor rather than going out.</li> <li>• Reviews of interview room - checklist for housekeeping</li> </ul> </li> <li>10. Victims' Board to consider solutions: Clarity is required over support and referrals, a clear picture of who is providing what support and why.</li> </ol>	
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			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No clarity on who is main child support at each stage</li> <li>• Goleudy is not always aware of who else is supporting the child.</li> <li>• Officers are not always aware of what support is there for the child.</li> <li>• Goleudy do not have child trained officer.</li> <li>• Query whether it is explained to the child / parents who is providing what support.</li> <li>• It is often GPs who refer young victims for support and the GPs often don't know who to refer to.</li> <li>• There is no statutory obligation for any particular organisation to fund counselling.</li> </ul> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>11. IT fix for Case Prep / Digital Portal to flag as child victim and get notifications to Pre Charge Advisors.</li> <li>12. Reintroduce Rape and Serious Sexual Offences unit attachment for new Detective Inspectors.</li> <li>13. Criminal Justice board to discuss out of court disposals (child on child) via Youth Bureau process. If not suitable, how do we ensure opportunity to support victim?</li> <li>14. Criminal Justice board to discuss time limits post-charge to complete further work requests. There is a 14 day limit to provide additional material (Officer In Case gets 7 days) which has implications later for Judiciary.</li> <li>15. Regional Safeguarding Board to discuss impact of changes to Bail arrangements and implications for safeguarding.</li> </ol>	
Outcome 16 Review	Performance and Governance Team	September 2018	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. By means of crime audit examination, further investigation into the use and suitability of Outcome 16 is recommended to fully underpin the mechanism surrounding its frequent application.</li> <li>2. While an inverse correlative relationship may exist between volumes of Outcome 16: <i>Victim Does Not (or has withdrawn) Support</i> and Outcome 18: <i>No Suspect</i></li> </ol>	

			<i>Identified</i> , further research is required to further examine this association.	
Rape and Serious Sexual Offences Review	Performance and Governance Team	September 2018	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A multi-agency continuous improvement event focusing on the end to end process should be held for all parties to understand their role in the delays and to drive improvements</li> <li>2. A review of work processes within the Digital Communications and Cyber-crime Unit (DCCU) should be commissioned in an attempt to reduce the significant time taken in both the submission and analysis processes.</li> <li>3. A demand review of the DCCU should be initiated before the end of 2019 to understand fully the workloads within the unit, how they could be mitigated and issues that should feed into the 2019 Force Management Statement</li> </ol>	
Outcome 16 Review	Diane Davies	November 2018	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Performance manager to consider whether Force Control Centre (FCC) staff should develop questioning skills using more open style questions.</li> <li>2. FCC staff to develop the Investigation element of THRIVES to include early identification and preservation of forensic evidence.</li> <li>3. FCC staff to ensure that the correct victim details are captured on Storm, particularly where a parent makes a 3rd party report on behalf of a child.</li> <li>4. Force Crime Incident Registrar (FCIR) to update policy on requirements for Outcome 16 finalisation</li> <li>5. FCIR to develop a single page crib sheet for staff summarising each available Outcome.</li> <li>6. FCIR to provide bespoke training and awareness on Outcomes to Crime Data Integrity (CDI) Champions.</li> <li>7. CDI Champions to promulgate awareness of Outcomes and in particular key message that there is no "preferred Outcome".</li> <li>8. CDI Champions to identify and feedback to FCIR any internal processes or impediments to consistent and accurate application of Outcomes.</li> </ol>	

			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>9. Performance and Outcomes Board to monitor Outcomes data and action any trend that suggest potential anomaly.</li> <li>10. Victims Code Of Practice Lead to develop an action plan for improved performance.</li> <li>11. THRIVES to be considered on the force Training Needs Analysis and training prioritised.</li> <li>12. Crime Recording and Investigation policy to include an expectation that named suspects will be seen by police and exceptions require a rationale to be recorded.</li> <li>13. Consider development of a multi-agency Joint Audit Task and Finish Group to review sample sets of Domestic Incident cases particularly where there is a child in the household.</li> <li>14. The Crime Recording User Group to consider a Task and Finish Group to probe and understand the high incidents of skeleton records as a result of Domestic Crimes and reduce the bureaucracy attributed.</li> <li>15. Consider a Qlikview tab to highlight open cases over 6 weeks old to be raised at Daily Management Meetings</li> <li>16. Local Performance Meetings to consider open cases over 3 months</li> <li>17. Protecting Vulnerable People Unit lead to discuss with Regional Safeguarding Board CYSUR and agree protocol for sexual activity involving children and young people over 13 and under 16 years.</li> </ol>	
Sexual Offences Review	Performance and Governance Team	January 2019	No recommendations made. Key findings include prevalence of mental health as reason for victim withdrawal.	
Domestic Abuse	Assistant Director of	January 2019	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Mandatory questions for Goleudy not completed by officer- question to be reviewed, need authorisation.</li> </ol>	

	Criminal Justice		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. Quality of Domestic Abuse Stalking and Harassment (DASH) submission – being addressed via Domestic Abuse (DA) Review</li> <li>3. Secure mail issue. Not all DA referrals are coming through to the Independent Domestic Violence Advisors (IDVA) – Legal mail updated</li> <li>4. Potential duplication between Goleudy, Criminal Investigation Department, Domestic Abuse Officers (DAOs) etc in respect of referrals to Neighbourhood Tasking Unit</li> <li>5. Time taken from complaint to charge impacting on victim &amp; support agencies – early investigation advice and Digital Comms and Cybercrime Unit intervention</li> <li>6. Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) Direct wrongly advising officers that they should make a caution decision without referring to CPS Direct first – addressed via Directors Guidance to Charging</li> <li>7. CPS Action Plans - not all points being actioned by the officer – Plan in place, compliance monitored</li> <li>8. Not all safe numbers are being pulled through from Mobile Data Terminals onto Crime Management System. Estimate only 50% of data being pulled through. IT working on fix</li> <li>9. Where there have been protracted enquiries, supporting agencies and DAOs are not automatically updated when No Further Action / Caution is administered - query automatic process from Police National Computer.</li> <li>10. Confusion over whose responsibility it is to update victim, resulting in numerous agencies contacting victim</li> <li>11. CPS file-review deadlines not always met. Long delays in advice re: Special Measures- CPS to prioritise</li> <li>12. Postal Requisition - safeguarding concerns for victim- Review process and letters</li> <li>13. Late requests from CPS to Witness Care Unit (WCU) to warn victim to attend court. Leaves little time for WCU to get hold of victim and make necessary arrangements.</li> </ol>	
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			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>14. Pembs/Ceredigion IDVAs no longer receive updates regarding High Risk cases in Court – WCU to resolve</li> <li>15. Misuse of IDVAs by both Defence and Prosecution to be raised via Specialist Domestic Violence Court (SDVC)</li> <li>16. Haverfordwest Magistrates Court - issues with layout. To be picked up by SDVC</li> <li>17. Victim use of Video Link or screens in court – Officers to explain to victims via Special Measures</li> <li>18. Speed of updates to victim. Victim sometimes see the result on social media before receiving the official update. Open court - no control over attendees</li> <li>19. Outcomes of Saturday Remand Courts not picked up by WCU until Monday: Single Point Of Contact to be identified in Ops Room</li> <li>20. Processes re: sentencing. Criminal Justice Department to feed back to Local Criminal Justice Board</li> <li>21. Restraining Order: Sometimes the victim doesn't receive a copy - Courts to provide update</li> </ol>	
Domestic Abuse process mapping	Domestic Abuse Review lead officers	May 2019	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Review numbers of Domestic Abuse Stalking and Harassment (DASH) forms coming in from third parties and missing information as no DASH recorded internally and linked to Crime</li> <li>2. Look at Crime Data Integrity issues</li> <li>3. Check if any synergy between vulnerability hub &amp; Crime Recording Unit /Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC)</li> <li>4. Check if Force Intel Bureau (FIB) are missing some Domestic Abuse (DA) Victims/repeat victim information</li> <li>5. Crime Audit Team to look at changes to opening codes</li> <li>6. Force Crime Registrar (FCR) to give details of the audits i.e. fields\areas looked at</li> <li>7. Crime Audit Team to look at capacity to increase audits</li> <li>8. Comms to officers to explain process and possible delays to them getting information from DA desk</li> </ol>	



			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>9. Communication re clarity on responsibilities between various desks (Firearms, Intel, FIB)</li> <li>10. Information sharing agreement with Probation; intelligence sharing, markers etc.</li> <li>11. Review and refine briefing document, decide what information needed for Crown Prosecution Service from briefing package</li> <li>12. Desk to tell officers if there are immediate issues before package is completed</li> <li>13. Review disputes</li> <li>14. Need to understand increase in MARAC referrals - need a better threshold as to what goes into MARAC and what doesn't</li> <li>15. Comms needed re DASH for under 16s when there doesn't need one</li> <li>16. Need quality of DASH to feed into a central repository - learning the lessons and on Basic Command Units</li> <li>17. Can Crime Audit Team send improvements they are seeing in relation to children details, firearms etc</li> <li>18. Check repeat victim issue - booklets not being updated - officers need to contact Crime Recording Bureau to update it.</li> <li>19. Comms to officers to check questions re arrest made, appropriate action to mitigate risk etc. prior to leaving scene</li> <li>20. Look at realigning the performance meetings to ensure DA is being covered</li> <li>21. Comms re the purpose and importance of officers having to complete the DASH</li> <li>22. Need to Quality Assure the Risk Assessments</li> <li>23. Check for missing data and turn the auto forward off so a button has to be pressed to share info</li> <li>24. VAWDASV Regional Board to pick up issue of sharing information between different Local Authorities</li> <li>25. Check to see what is being sent out by the system regarding vulnerable adults/dependants</li> </ol>	
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			<p>26. Check Pregnancy field being shared</p> <p>27. FCR to ensure that adult dependants are not removed from the dependants section</p> <p>28. Clarify average number going to MARAC and average cost</p> <p>29. FCR /Crime Audit to sit with Desk to Quality Assure</p> <p>30. Task and finish group to be set up to sort out functions of the desk - DA Champions, desk to tweak functions.</p>	
Sexual offences victim pathway workshop (adults)	Chief Inspector with portfolio and Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner.	July 2019	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Future SARC sites identified through regional project- Aberystwyth, Swansea, Cardiff. Concerns raised regarding loss of provision in Carmarthen where there is currently 24 hour A&amp;E provision close to SARC. How will this work at Aberystwyth? To be raised at Regional Project Board</li> <li>2. All victims will now be interviewed by PIP2 trained Detective Constable (College of Policing change). Role of Sexual Offences Trained Officer (SOTO) has changed. Review of demand and number of SOTOs to be undertaken.</li> <li>3. Roles of all involved (SOTO, Crisis Worker, Independent Sexual Violence Advisor, Goleudy, Citizens Advice Witness Service) to be clearly explained in training inputs, particularly Criminal Investigation Department training, and also clarity around provision to enable officers to manage victims expectations eg. Expect a wait for counselling services</li> <li>4. Provision of Health part of examination has been addressed at regional level. If particular issues arise locally in the meantime, to be raised through Rape and Serious Sexual Offences group.</li> <li>5. New Pathways to consider the lone working policy and the impact this is having. Already developing work via GP practices etc. to achieve more outreach locations.</li> <li>6. Goleudy to support families of child victims, but children and adult Sexual Offence victims to be supported by New Pathways exclusively.</li> </ol>	

			<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>7. Goleudy IT system to automatically feed through to update Crime Management System that Goleudy have had contact (record that contact made, but no detail of discussion) - Goleudy to address with IS&amp;T. To be noted manually in the interim</li><li>8. Legal issues to be addressed - will not allow victim details to be sent directly to New Pathways at present.</li><li>9. Confusion around who will provide what contact, and how often</li><li>10. Officer In Case to make it very clear in victim's contract what information / how often they will provide, and explain what contact and support will be provided by New Pathways.</li><li>11. Communications to all officers regarding victim contract and management of expectations</li><li>12. In light of above changes, Force policy to be reviewed and updated</li></ol>	
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